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I. INTRODUCTION 
Social media has opened a whole new world of opportunity for 
government officials to communicate with citizens and receive feedback in 
a timely and cost-effective manner. Gone are the days where local officials 
personally connected with constituents only through pounding the 
pavement, running county fair booths, and hosting town hall meetings. 
When and how they use social media sites for official versus private 
purposes has created a technology-led evolution in First Amendment 
jurisprudence, but this evolution is one that is providing slow and confusing 
legal guidance to elected leaders. At the same time, online applications and 
new social media platforms are being launched at breakneck speeds. This 
Article will describe the public forum and government speech doctrines, 
provide an analysis of internet-based communications using these First 
Amendment principles, and discuss blocking and comment deletions in the 
context of recent court decisions involving government officials on social 
media.  
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II. FORUM DESIGNATIONS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The First Amendment and the public forum doctrine have been 
inextricably linked since the early decades of the twentieth century. Prior to 
the United States Supreme Court’s 1925 recognition of the freedom of 
speech as a personal right, the government could abridge an individual’s 
right to speak on government property in the same manner as that of a 
private owner.1 However, while an individual’s First Amendment freedoms 
cannot be abridged or reduced, they are not absolute where government 
property is concerned. Just as we cannot bust our lungs singing opera in a 
public library, we must also recognize a societal need to balance the 
competing uses of government property with the individual’s right to free 
speech. This is the purpose of the forum analysis, where courts categorize 
government property as a type of forum.2 When a court is deciding if a 
government regulation burdening speech is constitutional, the court will first 
categorize the location to which a speaker seeks access for the purpose of 
expressive activity as a type of forum, and then analyze the government’s 
restriction on speech against the constitutional standard that governs in that 
forum. 
A. The Three Categories of Forums 
There are three categories of forums—the first is the traditional 
public forum: the streets and parks.3 The government has the least control 
over an individual’s expressive conduct in this traditional public forum.4 The 
contours of the public forum emerged in the 1970s when the United States 
Supreme Court used “public forum” as a legal term and stated that any 
restrictions must be “carefully scrutinized.”5 By contrast, during this period, 
the Court defined a non-public forum, places like military bases, in Greer 
v. Spock.6 In a non-public forum, the government has the most authority to 
control an individual’s expressive conduct.7 The third category is limited 
                                                           
ǂ Patricia Y. Beety, General Counsel, League of Minnesota Cities, St. Paul, Minnesota; BA 
and JD, University of Minnesota. Joline Zepcevski, JD, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, 
2020; PhD, University of Minnesota, 2012. 
1 Ronnie J. Fischer, Comment, “What’s in a Name?”: An Attempt to Resolve the “Analytic 
Ambiguity” of the Designated and Limited Public Fora, 107 DICK. L. REV. 639, 646 (2003) 
(quoting Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897)). 
2 Note, Strict Scrutiny in the Middle Forum, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2140, 2140–41 (2009). 
3 Id. at 2145 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 
(1983)). 
4 See id. at 2145.  
5 Id. at 2144 (quoting Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98–99 (1972)). 
6 Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 829 (1976) (upholding military regulations banning political 
speech on military bases). 
7 Strict Scrutiny in the Middle Forum, supra note 2, at 2145.  
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and designated public forums, which arose as a middle ground and are 
created by purposeful government action.8 The designated or limited public 
forum is an attempt to determine what happens when the government allows 
some people the freedom of expression on its property, but selectively 
denies access to others.9  
B. Forum-based Regulations 
The category of forum then defines how government regulation of 
expressive activity will be reviewed by the court. A traditional public forum 
will be subject to strict scrutiny.10 This usually means the regulation must be 
content neutral and only address the time, place, and manner of the 
expressive speech, leaving open ample alternative avenues for expression.11 
If the regulation is not content neutral, rather based on the content of the 
speech, the government will need to prove that the regulation is narrowly 
tailored to accomplish a compelling government interest.12 If a court finds 
that the forum is a non-public forum, the court will look to whether the 
regulation is a reasonable limitation of expressive activity that does not 
discriminate based on viewpoint.13 Finally, if a court finds that the forum is 
limited or designated, the court will determine whether the limits are 
reasonable based on the purpose of the forum and whether the restriction 
is viewpoint neutral—restrictions based on viewpoint are always subject to 
strict scrutiny.14 
C. The Public Forum Doctrine in Digital Spaces 
Historically, the United States Supreme Court’s public forum cases 
focused on either physical places or resources that were under the 
government’s exclusive control and were rooted in the idea that a public 
forum is one traditionally open to expressive activity.15 
                                                           
8 See generally William Howard, Annotation, Constitutionality of Restricting Public Speech 
in Street, Sidewalk, Park, or Other Public Forum—Characteristics of Forum, 70 A.L.R.6TH 
513 (2011) (reviewing cases regarding the constitutionality of public speech restrictions based 
on the characteristics of the forum involved). 
9 Seth D. Rogers, Case Note, Constitutional Law - A Forum by Any Other Name . . . Would 
Be Just As Confusing: The Tenth Circuit Dismisses Intent from the Public Forum. First 
Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2002), 4 WYO. L. REV. 
753, 765 (2004). 
10 Howard, supra note 8, at 3. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).  
14 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469–70 (2009) (citing Good News 
Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001)). 
15 See Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 1994 n.129 (2011). 
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As recently as 2010, commenters argued that the public forum 
doctrine could not apply to the internet because public forums are places 
that have “immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, 
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating 
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”16 Because of the 
recent nature of internet communications, this would place the internet 
outside of the definition of a traditional public forum. 
Instead, courts have applied the definition from Cornelius v. 
NAACP—that a public forum exists when a principal purpose of the fora is 
the free exchange of ideas.17 This is the underpinning of the internet, from 
a time even prior to the creation of what we now describe as the internet, as 
reflected in J.C.R. Licklider and Robert Taylor’s The Computer as a 
Communication Device.18 
Current jurisprudence further makes it clear that the court defines 
a public forum as more amorphous than a geographical location and not 
dependent on ownership. In Rosenberger v. Rector, the United States 
Supreme Court stated that a forum could be more metaphysical than 
geographic, and the same principles will apply.19 In Reno v. ACLU, plaintiffs 
challenged the constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act.20 In 
this case, the Court stated that because the internet has vast democratic 
forums and is distinguished from broadcast television, there is “no basis for 
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny” applied to the internet. 21 
The Court, comparing users to town criers or pamphleteers, foreshadowed 
the later circuit decisions that currently define social media as a public 
forum.  
Moreover, in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, the Court 
held that public or private ownership of property was not dispositive of 
whether the property was a public forum.22 This was further supported in 
Cornelius v. NAACP,23 and later reiterated in Denver Area 
Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC,24 where the Court found that 
public access channels were a traditional public forum because the privately-
                                                           
16 David S. Ardia, Government Speech and Online Forums: First Amendment Limitations 
on Moderating Public Discourse on Government Websites, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1981, 1998 
(2010) (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). 
17 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985). 
18 J.C.R. Licklider & Robert W. Taylor, The Computer as a Communication Device, SCI. & 
TECH. 21, 21–22 (Apr. 1968). 
19 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995). 
20 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 861 (1997). 
21 Id. at 870. 
22 Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555–56 (1975). 
23 473 U.S. 788 (1985). 
24 518 U.S. 727 (1996). 
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owned stations were controlled by the government and opened by the 
government for use by the public.25 
This line of analysis is important in a discussion of government 
officials’ use of social media because it must be first asserted that the forum 
analysis is appropriately applied to social media. As social media platforms 
are privately owned, not a geographic location, and not rooted in tradition, 
on its face, the application of the public forum doctrine appears 
inapplicable. Recent cases have addressed the threshold question of 
whether forum analysis applies in this context, and trending precedent 
indicates that the First Amendment does indeed apply to government 
controlled digital spaces and a forum analysis is appropriate. 
D. The Government Speech Exception  
There is “no constitutional right as members of the public to a 
government audience for their policy views.”26 Government property used 
by the government for its own speech is not subject to these public fora 
limitations because the First Amendment does not apply to the 
government’s own speech—the government is not attempting to control the 
speech of its citizens when it speaks. The government, when acting as the 
speaker, may express viewpoints.27 
Prior to the widespread introduction of social media, it would have 
been fair to characterize government use of the internet, as opposed to 
regulation of the internet, as government speech. Public-facing websites, 
controlled by governmental bodies or officials, that provide information to 
the public about governmental functions, rules, or policies with little to no 
interactive capability were the norm throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.28 
This shifted dramatically as we moved into the 2008 election season.29 A 
2009 Pew survey showed that twenty-five percent of internet users engaged 
interactively with the government over the internet.30 Today, the number of 
                                                           
25 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801; Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 774 
(1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring). For further discussion of ownership and the public forum 
doctrine, see Dawn Carla Nunziato, From Town Square to Twittersphere: The Public 
Forum Doctrine Goes Digital, 25 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 62–64 (2019). 
26 Minn. State Bd. For Cmty. Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 286 (1984). 
27 Andy G. Olree, Identifying Government Speech, 42 CONN. L. REV. 365, 368–70 (2009). 
28 See Ardia, supra note 16, at 1986. 
29 See id. at 1986–88; Aaron Smith, The Internet’s Role in Campaign 2008, PEW RESEARCH 
CTR. INTERNET & TECH. (Apr. 15, 2009), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2009/04/15/the-internets-role-in-campaign-2008/ 
[https://perma.cc/EW2N-YLH5].   
30 Aaron Smith, Government Online, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT 1, 2 (Apr. 
27, 2010), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2010/04/27/government-online-2/ 
[https://perma.cc/GQ9A-QU5K].  
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government-controlled websites, social media accounts, and other online 
interactive forums is innumerable.31 
While the scale of communication has changed, what is more 
important is that this is a revolution in how Americans are able to engage 
with their government. The internet provides direct engagement. It has 
broken down physical barriers to entering the public discourse, removing 
the middleman of mass media. However, this does not mean that there is 
no longer a middleman. Instead, the intermediary is now the content 
providers—whether that be the government itself, through apps and websites 
on government-controlled servers, or private networks like Facebook and 
Twitter. The internet is not a public medium.32 
When addressing social media specifically, the intimacy of this 
private medium allows both individuals and government agents to behave 
as though the conversations they are having are not mediated by the same 
set of norms and regulations as they would be in a city council meeting or 
an in-person town hall. This illusion of private conversation allows 
government agents, like a local city council member, to act as they would 
privately: blocking an acquaintance they disagree with or deleting a 
comment they find distasteful. In their personal use of these mediums, these 
acts are almost reflexive because of the nature of the medium itself.  
These private networks encourage blocking, deleting, and reporting 
posts that violate their terms of service. As intermediaries, the private 
networks may act sua sponte, banning or limiting accounts for violating the 
terms of service as interpreted by an automated algorithmic function.33 Even 
assessing whether the comment or post was deleted or hidden by a 
government agent or the private network is not necessarily straightforward. 
The individual usually is not informed who deleted or hid the content, so 
they must request the information from the private network.34 
Yet, when acting as a representative of the government, these acts 
of deletion and blocking can impact and potentially burden the exercise of 
the speech and expression of their constituents. Because of the shift in both 
the scale and manner of communication between government agents and 
                                                           
31 This is not tracked, but for context, in 2017, the Information Technology and Innovation 
Foundation found that the federal government had more than 6,000 websites on government 
servers, not including social media accounts or forums hosted on other platforms. See Alan 
McQuinn & Daniel Castro, Benchmarking U.S. Government Websites, ITIF (Mar. 8, 
2017), https://itif.org/publications/2017/03/08/benchmarking-us-government-websites 
[https://perma.cc/H22M-E2PC]. 
32 For a broader, but somewhat dated discussion of this, see Ardia, supra note 16, at 1989. 
33 See id. at 1991.  
34 For a conversation about how the private nature of social media companies shapes the 
public discourse, see Daphne Keller, Facebook Restricts Speech by Popular Demand, 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 2, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/09/facebook-
restricts-free-speech-popular-demand/598462/ [https://perma.cc/ESR7-U4FF].  
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citizens, the question of how that communication can and should be 
regulated is now coming before the courts. 
III. WHAT TYPE OF FORUM WAS THE INTERNET 
AND WHAT HAS IT BECOME? 
A. First Evolution: The Appropriate Doctrine—Government Speech or 
the Forum Analysis? 
Prior to 2010, there was virtually no standard for defining how the 
government could regulate speech on the internet.35 Early cases revolved 
around government websites, with limited interactivity—pages that contained 
“local links,” online forums for job seekers to exchange information, or 
informational pages that presented the point of view of a local government 
sub-unit. The discussion trended towards asking whether these websites 
presented government speech or if the government had created a non-
public forum. 
In Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, the city operated a website 
that included a “local links” page that promoted local businesses.36 An 
independent newspaper, The Putnam Pit, known for its critical view of the 
local government, requested that its website be added to the local links 
page.37 Cookeville created a policy limiting links to non-profit entities and 
organizations that “would promote the economic welfare, tourism, and 
industry of the city.”38 The paper sued, calling the page a designated public 
forum and arguing that this policy was impermissible viewpoint 
discrimination.39 The Sixth Circuit held that the website was a non-public 
forum.40  
Similarly, in Cahill v. Texas Workforce Commission, the plaintiff 
sought to post comments and other information about employers on the 
Texas Workforce Commission’s website.41 Cahill was excluded because the 
website limited access to people seeking workers or jobs; he argued that this 
was viewpoint discrimination.42 The court held that the website was a non-
public forum, and therefore, the state had properly limited access to 
                                                           
35 See generally Alissa Ardito, Social Media, Administrative Agencies, and the First 
Amendment, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 301 (2013) (presenting an analysis of the conflict between 
the free speech rights of the government and of its citizens created by the social media 
forum); Ardia, supra note 16, at 2019. 
36 Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, 76 F. App’x 607, 610 (6th Cir. 2003). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 610–11. 
39 See id. at 611–12. 
40 Id. at 612. 
41 Cahill v. Texas Workforce Comm’n, 198 F. Supp. 2d 832, 833 (E.D. Tex. 2002). 
42 Id.  
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speakers who were members of the class of speakers for whose benefit the 
website was created.43  
However, in Page v. Lexington County School District One, a 
school district opposing a tax credit bill for private and parochial tuition and 
homeschooling expenses expressed their discontent on the school’s website 
and included links to emails and letters written by private citizens who also 
opposed the bill.44 The plaintiff argued this created a public forum because 
of the links to documents by private citizens.45 The court found the website 
was government speech, regardless of the links to other documents, but 
stated in dicta that had the website been interactive, where individuals could 
express opinions or post information, the issue would be different.46 A small 
consensus seemed to have formed that interactive websites were likely non-
public forums, where viewpoint discrimination would still be 
unconstitutional, while static websites were likely to be government speech. 
However, this consensus was indeed small and did not predict the wave of 
“blocking” litigation that was soon to arise. 
B. “Blocking” Litigation: How Unfriending Someone Really is a “Federal 
Case” 
The 2016 election cycle was clear in at least one respect: no level of 
government or candidate could afford to ignore the power of social media.47 
During this contentious election season, incumbent candidates, as seated 
governmental officials, found out that they could not block their opponents 
on social media.48 This allowed political opponents to comment, troll, 49 and 
self-promote as much as they pleased on opposing candidate’s pages. As 
nerves frayed, cases arose that forced district courts to balance individual 
rights to freedom of speech with government officials’ rights to present a 
coherent message on social media platforms. 
Before these cases made their way through federal district and 
appellate court systems, the United States Supreme Court heard and ruled 
on Packingham v. North Carolina.50 The Packingham case centered not on 
                                                           
43 Id. at 836. 
44 Page v. Lexington Cnty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 277–78 (4th Cir. 2008). 
45 Id. at 279–280. 
46 See id. at 284. 
47 Marissa Lang, 2016 Presidential Election Circus: Is Social Media the Cause?, SAN 
FRANCISCO CHRON. (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.govtech.com/social/2016-Presidential-
Election-Circus-Is-Social-Media-the-Cause.html [https://perma.cc/4736-32N4]. 
48 See infra text accompanying notes 58–61.  
49 “Troll: to antagonize (others) online by deliberately posting inflammatory, irrelevant, or 
offensive comments or other disruptive content.” Troll, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/troll [https://perma.cc/GV4Q-4G4C]. 
50 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737–38 (2017). 
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electioneering, but on a North Carolina law preventing registered sex 
offenders from accessing any commercial social networking sites where 
minor children may become members.51 The Court held that the law was 
not narrowly tailored to the significant government interest in protecting 
children from abuse.52 In dicta for this case, the Justices stated that social 
networking sites are the equivalent of the modern public square.53 
Numerous circuits then began using this language in the blocking cases to 
apply a public forum analysis to the use of social media by government 
officials. 
1. The First Wave of Blocking Litigation: 2018 
The first of the blocking cases heard in district court was Morgan v. 
Bevin.54 In this case, two constituents alleged violations of their First 
Amendment rights due to being blocked from commenting on the 
Kentucky Governor’s Twitter and Facebook pages, which the plaintiffs 
argued were traditional public fora.55 The Governor disagreed, stating that 
neither social media account was meant to be an “open forum for general 
discussion of all issues by the public,” but he did label them as limited public 
fora.56 Using a Minnesota case challenging the application of the Public 
Employment Labor Relations Act (PELRA), the district court in Bevin 
disagreed with the parties’ application of the public forum doctrine and held 
that the Governor’s social media pages were not subject to a forum analysis.57  
The court found the Governor was engaging in government speech, 
which allowed for the government to advance its own speech without 
viewpoint neutrality.58 In particular, the court held the Governor’s Twitter 
and Facebook accounts were a means for communicating his own speech, 
not for the speech of his constituents.59 In this way, the accounts were unlike 
a traditional public forum meant for group discussion. The court was moved 
by the Governor’s argument that the consequence of allowing anyone to 
access and post on these social media accounts could shut down the pages 
altogether.60 This is because without culling comments on a government 
official’s social media accounts, the court reasoned the communication 
                                                           
51 Id. at 1731. 
52 Id. at 1737. 
53 Id. 
54 Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003 (E.D. Ky. 2018). 
55 See id. at 1006. 
56 Id. at 1006, 1010–11. 
57 Id. at 1010–11 (referencing Minnesota State Bd. for Cmty. Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 
271 (1984)). 
58 Id. at 1011. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 1012. 
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could be so overtaken with unrelated expressive activity that the accounts 
would be useless and abandoned, much like a public park if every statue or 
monument must be accepted as protected, expressive activity.61  
At the same time, the Southern District of New York had two cases 
on similar facts. The first case the Southern District of New York ruled on 
was Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. Trump, 
later affirmed by the Second Circuit.62 Briefly put, the case revolved around 
whether it was constitutional for President Trump to block Twitter users 
from his account.63 At the district level, the court in Knight set out that if an 
account is owned or controlled by the government, and contains an 
interactive space, that portion of the account is a designated public forum.64 
As such, blocking users from that space is impermissible viewpoint 
discrimination.65  
This was quickly followed by Price v. City of New York.66 In Price, 
the plaintiff believed police officers and the district attorney’s office 
mishandled a series of domestic assault complaints.67 The plaintiff 
addressed her complaints in-person, and later, using social media.68 The 
plaintiff was then blocked from the NYPD’s 28th Precinct Twitter account 
(@NYPD28Pct); an account managed by the New York City Mayor’s Office 
dedicated to combating domestic violence (@NYCagainstabuse); and an 
account named @RPLNYC, allegedly moderated by Commissioner Pierre-
Louis.69 Plaintiff sued the City, ten city employees—including all three 
moderators—and two MTA employees.70 The City did not dispute that 
Brooks and Obe (moderators of @NYCagainstabuse and @NYPD28Pct, 
respectively) acted under the color of law, arguing that the curation of the 
account was in the service of government speech.71  
Here, the court pushed back against this government speech 
argument, stating that reasonable observers would understand that the 
plaintiff’s reply tweets criticizing the government were not the City’s own 
speech.72 The court reiterated the First Amendment analysis undertaken by 
                                                           
61 Id.  
62 Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D. 
N.Y. 2018) [hereinafter this case and the Second Circuit case will be collectively referred to 
as Knight v. Trump or Knight]. 
63 Id. at 549. 
64 Id. at 574. 
65 See id. at 577. 
66 Price v. City of New York, No. 15 Civ. 5871 (KPF), 2018 WL 3117507 (S.D. N.Y. June 
25, 2018). 
67 Id. at *2. 
68 Id. at *2–3. 
69 Id. at *3.  
70 Id. at *1, *4. 
71 Id. at *10. 
72 Id. at *14. 
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the district court in the Knight case, setting out that the account must be 
owned or controlled by the government, limiting the forum analysis to the 
interactive space, and concluding that it was a public forum.73 However, 
unlike in Knight, the Price court did not extend the notion of a traditional 
public forum to encapsulate the City’s Twitter account, nor exclude the 
Twitter accounts by defining them as non-public forums.74 The court held it 
did not need to resolve the issue because the evidence so strongly suggested 
that the plaintiff was blocked to prevent public criticism, which is 
impermissible viewpoint discrimination in any forum subject to the Free 
Speech Clause.75 
Meanwhile, in the First Circuit, constituents filed a complaint 
alleging that Maine Governor Paul LePage restricted access to, and deleted 
comments from, a social media page that the Governor managed, violating 
their right to free speech.76 In Leuthy v. LePage, the Governor filed an 
interlocutory appeal after the lower court declined to dismiss, arguing that a 
government official is acting as a speaker, not as the regulator of a public 
forum, when they exercise editorial discretion over the content on a social 
media page.77 When the State is the speaker, it may make content-based 
choices.78 The court held that the matter was not appropriate for 
interlocutory appeal because the parties disagreed on a central fact: is the 
webpage the Governor’s official webpage or a third-party webpage over 
which the Governor posts comments and exercises some control.79 This 
factual decision would impact what standard would apply.80 The case settled 
without reaching the underlying question: was this a public forum analysis 
or government speech? 
At the end of the 2018 spate of litigation, there was no clear 
consensus. The Sixth and First Circuits still entertained the idea that the use 
of social media accounts were government speech and, therefore, able to 
discriminate against viewpoint. However, the Second Circuit set a stronger 
precedent for finding that the interactive portions of social media accounts 
should be subject to a public forum analysis, even if there was no holding 
on what type of forum category should be applied. 
                                                           
73 Id. at *10. 
74 Id. at *15. 
75 Id. at *16. 
76 Leuthy v. LePage, No. 1:17-CV-00296-JAW, 2018 WL 4955194, at *1 (D. Me. Oct. 12, 
2018). 
77 Id. at *1. 
78 Id. at *3. 
79 Id. at *11–12. 
80 Id. at *5. 
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2. 2019: An Early Consensus 
As a wave of these cases began to hit the courts in 2019, the Fourth 
Circuit released a strong opinion, Davison v. Randall,81 reinforcing the 
Southern District of New York’s opinion in Knight v. Trump.82 
The plaintiff brought a section 1983 action against Randall, the 
Chair of the Loudoun County Board, for violating his freedom of speech 
by banning him from Randall’s Facebook page.83 One element of this case 
that is important for municipal law is that, at the district level, Randall was 
denied qualified immunity.84 Randall argued that she was entitled to 
qualified immunity because the law surrounding social media and First 
Amendment rights is unsettled.85 The court recognized the Supreme Court’s 
rejection of the proposition that online speech is subjected to a different 
standard than other protected speech and, therefore, found that Randall was 
not entitled to qualified immunity.86 The court held that if the underlying 
allegations were true, Randall substantially violated a clearly established 
constitutional right of which a reasonable government official would have 
known.87 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit did not address qualified immunity. 
Instead, the court focused on whether the plaintiff had established an injury 
in fact sufficient to justify prospective declaratory relief and that Randall’s 
“purportedly private actions bear a ‘sufficiently close nexus’ with the state to 
satisfy . . . [the] color of law requirement.”88 In so holding, the factors the 
court examined included whether: (1) the conduct is such that the actor 
could not have behaved in the challenged way but for the authority of the 
actor’s office; (2) it occurs in the course of performing an actual or apparent 
duty of the actor’s office; (3) the official used the power and prestige of the 
office to damage the plaintiff; and (4) the challenged action by a 
governmental official is fairly attributable to the state when the sole intention 
of taking the action was to suppress speech critical of the actor’s conduct of 
official duties or fitness for public office.89 The Fourth Circuit found that 
                                                           
81 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019). 
82 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D. N.Y. 2018). 
83 Davison, 912 F.3d at 676. Note: Plaintiff had also brought an earlier claim against the 
Loudon County Board for violating Plaintiff’s freedom of speech, first for actions taken by 
the board on the Boards official page, which was found in dicta to be a limited public forum 
and as a respondeat superior claim for the actions of Randall. The court granted summary 
judgment for the board dismissing the suit. 





88 Davison, 912 F.3d at 679–80. 
89 Id. 
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Randall clothed the Facebook page in the “power and prestige” of her 
office, used the page to perform actual or apparent duties, that the specific 
action (banning plaintiff) was linked to events arising out of her official 
status, and that the ban was an effort to suppress critical speech.90 
In analyzing whether the Facebook page was a public forum, the 
court focused on the distinction between the interactive portion of a social 
media account and that of the official’s posts or tweets, ultimately rejecting 
Randall’s argument that the account was government speech and therefore 
not susceptible to forum analysis.91 The court did not address what type of 
forum the account should be categorized as, but held that the ban, under 
any designation, was viewpoint discrimination.92 The court also rejected the 
claim of municipal liability by holding that the plaintiff could not establish 
that Randall was the final municipal policymaker with regard to the ban, and 
instead the record established that the Board retained authority and had an 
established social media policy.93 
Simultaneously, in One Wisconsin Now v. Kremer, a nonprofit, 
One Wisconsin Now, alleged that three representatives of the Wisconsin 
State Assembly violated the First Amendment when they blocked a 
constituent from their respective Twitter accounts.94 In cross motions for 
summary judgment, the court held that the officials acted under color of law 
in creating and maintaining their respective Twitter accounts in their 
capacity as members of the Wisconsin State Assembly; the interactive 
portion of these Twitter accounts are designated public forums using the 
Knight, Randall, and Packingham analysis (supra); and content-based 
discrimination occurred when plaintiff’s Twitter account was blocked.95 The 
court followed precedent and accepted that the interactive portion of a 
Twitter account results in a designated public forum and, as such, the 
government cannot exclude speech based on content unless the exclusion 
can satisfy strict scrutiny.96 The court found the restrictions could not survive 
this high level of scrutiny and thus were impermissible and a violation of the 
plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.97  
Later that same year, California broke with this analysis in 
McKercher v. Morrison, determining this was not settled law and that the 
official was entitled to qualified immunity.98 In McKercher, the plaintiff was 
                                                           
90 Id. at 681. 
91 Id. at 684–86. 
92 Id. at 687. 
93 Id. at 689. 
94 One Wisconsin Now v. Kremer, 354 F. Supp. 3d 940, 941 (W.D. Wis. 2019). 
95 Id. at 949, 951–57. 
96 Id. at 955. 
97 Id. at 956. 
98 McKercher v. Morrison, No. 18CV1054 JM(BLM), 2019 WL 1098935 at *4–5 (S.D. Cal. 
Mar. 8, 2019). 
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blocked from what the court described as a city official’s “personal” social 
media account.99 Although, the plaintiff argued this was an official account.100 
After the case’s filing, the city official created additional social media 
accounts and clearly identified them as official accounts.101 The district court 
conducted no analysis of what would define a public versus official account. 
The court found the matter moot and that there was no standing because 
the official changed the original offensive behavior by unblocking all 
constituents and creating official accounts.102 The court noted the current 
contradictory district court cases and engaged in a discussion of qualified 
immunity.103 The court held that the issue of a public official’s private use of 
social media platforms, like Facebook, to communicate with constituents, 
among others, is not well-settled, to say nothing of “clearly established.”104 
Therefore, the official was entitled to qualified immunity.105 
At the same time as the California case was decided in 2019, 
Robinson v. Hunt County was heard in the Fifth Circuit.106 Plaintiff, a social 
media user, brought a section 1983 action against Hunt County, the county 
sheriff, and Hunt County employees, alleging that the office’s censorship of 
its social media page violated the First Amendment.107 The district court 
granted Hunt County’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.108 On 
appeal, the Fifth Circuit analyzed whether the plaintiff had stated a claim for 
municipal liability, stating the “plaintiff must allege ‘(1) an official policy (or 
custom), of which (2) a policy maker can be charged with actual or 
constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose “moving 
force” is that policy (or custom).’”109 
The court held that deleting plaintiff’s Facebook comments and 
banning her from the page was impermissible viewpoint discrimination 
because comments that are inappropriate are still protected speech.110 The 
court assumed the Facebook page was a public forum.111 Because viewpoint 
discrimination is impermissible in any public forum, no further analysis was 
deemed necessary to find a constitutional violation.112 Hunt County argued 
                                                           
99 Id. at *1. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at *2. 
102 Id.  
103 Id. at *3. 
104 Id. at *4. 
105 Id. at *5. 
106 Robinson v. Hunt Cnty., 921 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2019). 
107 Id. at 444–45. 
108 Id. at 446.  
109 Id. at 447 (internal citation omitted). 
110 Id.  
111 Id. at 448. 
112 Id. 
14
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 4
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol47/iss2/4
524 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
that it had not delegated social media authority to the sheriff, but the court 
rejected this argument, holding that the sheriff’s authority derived from his 
elected position, not by virtue of delegation.113 Therefore, the sheriff was 
found to be the final policymaker.114 The court also held that the plaintiff 
sufficiently pleaded an official policy of viewpoint discrimination because 
the written policy (an informal post published on the social media account) 
allowed for the deletion of inappropriate comments, and as a result, there 
was support for the claim that Hunt County had an explicit policy of 
viewpoint discrimination.115  
One month after the Fifth Circuit ruling, Virginia ruled on another 
blocking case, again applying a public forum analysis. In Windom v. 
Harshbarger, the plaintiff claimed that West Virginia House of Delegates 
Representative Harshbarger violated the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights 
when Harshbarger deleted the plaintiff’s comments and blocked the 
plaintiff from accessing Harshbarger’s Facebook page, which was used for 
official governmental communication.116 The plaintiff commented on the 
page to express opposition for a bill that Harshbarger 
supported.117Accordingly, the plaintiff alleged that “Harshbarger imposed a 
viewpoint-based restriction of speech” in a “limited public forum,” with no 
opportunity to appeal, further violating plaintiff’s rights under the Due 
Process Clause.118 
The court reasoned that private property, such as a Facebook page, 
can constitute a public forum if it was created by “purposeful government 
action.”119 Moreover, the court used a totality of the circumstances analysis120 
and the factors in Randall to find that Harshbarger’s conduct could bear a 
sufficiently close nexus with the state to be fairly treated as that of the state 
itself, and denied Harshbarger’s motion to dismiss.121 
It was at this juncture that the Knight v. Trump appeal was heard in 
the Second Circuit.122 The Second Circuit held “the First Amendment does 
not permit a public official who [uses] a social media account for . . . official 
                                                           
113 Id. at 448–49. 
114 Id. at 449. 
115 Id. 
116 Windom v. Harshbarger, 396 F. Supp. 3d 675, 679 (N.D. W. Va. 2019). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 684. 
120 Using Rossignol v. Voorhaar, F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2003), the Court found that while 
Harshbarger’s conduct did not meet all of the factors laid out in Randall, the question of 
“what is fairly attributable [to the State] is a matter of normative judgment, and the criteria 
lack rigid simplicity.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 
288, 295 (2001). 
121 Harshbarger, 396 F. Supp. 3d at 684–85. 
122 Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019).  
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purposes to exclude persons from an otherwise-open online dialogue 
because they expressed views with which the official disagrees.”123 The 
defendant, President Trump, made three arguments: (1) the account at issue 
is a vehicle for his own, personal speech; (2) the account is not a public 
forum, and even if it were, blocking comments does not prevent access; and 
(3) the posts are government speech to which the First Amendment does 
not apply.124  
The Second Circuit asserted that even if government control over 
the property is temporary, this does not determine whether the property is 
a public forum.125 “Temporary control by the government can still be control 
for First Amendment purposes.”126 The contention that the account is 
private was rejected because: (1) the record reflects substantial pervasive 
government involvement and control; (2) it is clothed in the trappings of the 
President; and (3) the account is used to communicate and interact with the 
public about matters related to official government business.127 The court 
reasoned that if the President is acting in an official capacity when he speaks 
from the account, he is also acting in an official capacity when blocking those 
who disagree with him.128  
Having established that the President is a government actor, the 
court applied a public forum analysis.129 The court found the President 
opened “an instrumentality of communication ‘for indiscriminate use by the 
general public’ creat[ing] a public forum,” which would preclude viewpoint 
discrimination.130 The court found that activities associated with Twitter are 
expressive conduct and held that, while the plaintiffs cannot require the 
President to listen, the government may not burden the plaintiffs’ ability to 
converse not only with the President but with the thousands of other users 
speaking to or about the President.131 The President was not entitled to 
censor viewpoints with which he disagreed, and the fact that the plaintiffs 
could post messages elsewhere did not alleviate the burden created.132 
The court rejected the argument that the speech should be 
evaluated under the government speech doctrine, which does not require 
the government to maintain viewpoint neutrality when the government 
speaks about its endeavors.133 The court distinguished between the 
                                                           
123 Id. at 230. 
124 Id. at 234. 
125 Id. at 235. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 235–36. 
128 Id. at 236. 
129 Id. at 236–37. 
130 Id. at 237. 
131 Id. at 237–38. 
132 Id. at 239. 
133 Id. at 239–40. 
16
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 4
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol47/iss2/4
526 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
President’s tweets and that of user-generated content, deciding on a narrow 
interpretation of the government speech doctrine to apply only to the 
content of the President’s posts and identifying the interactive elements of 
the account as part of a public forum.134 
In September, two months after the Knight v. Trump decision, the 
California Southern District Court ruled on Garnier v. Poway Unified 
School District.135 The defendants (Board members) created social media 
accounts to campaign for the school board.136 After the election, they 
repurposed these accounts to communicate school board activities to 
constituents.137 Both Board members maintained private accounts to 
communicate with friends and family.138 The plaintiffs were blocked from 
accounts for posting what the Board members characterized as “repetitive 
and unrelated” comments.139 The plaintiffs claimed they were blocked as 
retaliation for disagreeing with school board policies.140  
Board members argued that the plaintiffs did not have standing 
because they were not injured in fact and alternative means of 
communication with the board were available.141 However, the court, relying 
on Knight v. Trump, found an injury in fact because the plaintiff’s ability to 
communicate using social media was limited, and their injuries were 
“virtually certain” to continue because the plaintiffs remain blocked.142 The 
plaintiffs’ injuries were found to be concrete and particularized because, like 
the Twitter users in Knight, they own the accounts that were blocked and 
were each affected in a “personal and individual way.”143 However, finding 
no clear constitutional right to comment on government officials’ social 
media posts, Board members were found to be entitled to qualified 
immunity.144 
The court conducted a public forum analysis in this case and, 
relying on the factors used in Knight, noted that Board members had not 
adopted a comment policy to limit constituents’ interactions and had 
created a designated public forum.145 Board members argued that blocking 
is a time, place, and manner restriction because the plaintiffs’ posts were 
                                                           
134 Id. at 239. 
135 Garnier v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., No. 17-CV-2215-W JLB, 2019 WL 4736208 (S.D. 
Cal. Sept. 26, 2019). 
136 Id. at *1. 
137 Id.  
138 Id.  
139 Id. at *2. 
140 Id.  
141 Id. at *4. 
142 Id.  
143 Id.  
144 Id. at *5. 
145 Id. at *8. 
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repetitive and disrupted discussion.146 The court denied summary judgment 
of injunctive and declaratory relief because there was a dispute of material 
fact: finding that if the posts were not actually disruptive, the reason for 
blocking was pretextual and would therefore be a violation of plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment rights.147 
3. 2020: In the Shadow of the Supreme Court 
As government official social media cases continue to percolate up 
through the appellate level, they do so in the shadow of Knight v. Trump.148 
The timeline for this case is as follows: after the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit unanimously affirmed the district court’s holding that 
President Trump’s practice of blocking critics from his Twitter account 
violates the First Amendment, a petition for rehearing en banc was denied 
by a vote of 7–2; President Trump filed a writ of certiorari to the United 
States Supreme Court on August 20, 2020;149 and Knight submitted its 
opposing brief on September 21, 2020.150 While it is unclear whether 
Trump v. Knight will be heard by the Supreme Court, what is clear is that 
the circuits are relying heavily on a line found only in dicta in the 
Packingham case, which compares social media to the public square, a 
position that could be explicitly rejected once one of these cases is heard by 
the United States Supreme Court. 
Wagschal v. Skoufis151 illustrates how quickly the position that social 
media is subject to a public forum analysis has become cemented. In this 
case, the defendant, a New York State Senator, blocked a private citizen 
after the individual criticized the defendant’s policy positions.152 The court 
affirmed the test in Knight stating the court must determine: (1) whether the 
plaintiffs’ interactions with the state actor’s social media account are 
protected speech; (2) whether the social media account is a forum subject 
to First Amendment protections; (3) which type of forum analysis applies; 
and (4) whether the action was impermissible viewpoint discrimination.153 
The defendant conceded that, under Knight, his actions were 
unconstitutional.154 While the court never reached the case’s merit because 
                                                           
146 Id. at *11–12. 
147 Id. at *12. 
148 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019).  
149 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Trump v. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 
928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019) (No. 20-197).   
150 Brief of Respondents, Trump v. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 928 
F.3d 226 (No. 20-197). 
151 Wagschal v. Skoufis, 442 F. Supp. 3d 612 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). 
152 Id. at 615. 
153 Id. at 618. 
154 Id. at 622. 
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the senator unblocked the plaintiff before trial, making the issue moot, the 
court did emphasize that Knight “only protects ‘the blocked user’s right to 
speak in a discrete, measurable way,’” and that “[a] public official may 
choose to ‘selectively amplify the voices’ of certain users while hiding—or in 
the case of Twitter, muting—the voices of others.”155 
Similarly, the Sheriff of Sacramento County deleted comments by 
two leaders of Black Lives Matter Sacramento from the sheriff’s Facebook 
page, and later banned one of the plaintiffs from the page.156 In Lewis v. 
Jones, the plaintiffs were granted preliminary injunctions, preventing the 
defendant from banning the plaintiffs because the plaintiffs met the 
Winter’s test: that the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits; that the 
plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm without the injunction; whether 
the balance of equities and hardships is in the plaintiff’s favor; and whether 
an injunction is in the public interest.157  
The court then relied on Knight and Davison to show that the 
plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits because: (1) the defendant 
acted under the color of law because the administration of the Facebook 
page bore a sufficiently close nexus with the state because the defendant’s 
account bore the trappings of an official state run account and the action 
was related to events that arose out of the defendant’s official status; (2) the 
defendant’s page is a public forum because the defendant intentionally 
opened the public comment section for public discourse; (3) the defendant 
engaged in viewpoint discrimination because it was undisputed that the 
defendant banned plaintiffs after the plaintiffs commented on posts that they 
disagreed with and the defendant offered no alternative explanation.158 The 
court rejected the argument that the defendant was engaged in government 
speech and therefore entitled to curate that speech because, as discussed in 
both Knight and Davison, the plaintiffs’ speech was not government 
speech.159  
In Attwood v. Clemons, the defendant, a Representative in the 
Florida House of Representatives, took a different approach.160 After a 
constituent posted a comment opposing Representative Clemons’s policy 
on gun control, Representative Clemons blocked the constituent on both 
Facebook and Twitter.161 The plaintiff sued for declarative and injunctive 
                                                           
155 Id. at 623. 
156 Lewis v. Jones, 440 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1130 (E.D. Cal. 2020). 
157 Id. at 1131 (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). See also 
id. at 1137 (applying the analysis of the Winter’s test). 
158 Id. at 1131–37. 
159 Id.  
160 Attwood v. Clemons, 818 F. App’x 863, 866 (11th Cir. 2020). 
161 Id.  
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relief.162 The defendant argued he was entitled to both Eleventh 
Amendment immunity and absolute legislative immunity.163 The court 
found that “the Eleventh Amendment provides no shield for a state official 
confronted by a claim that he had deprived another of a federal right under 
the color of state law,” and cited to the Second and Fourth Circuit decisions 
that social media accounts are a public forum.164 The court also found that 
legislative immunity is confined to the activities that further an elected 
official’s legislative duties but “Representative Clemons’s [use of] Twitter 
and Facebook . . . [were] not ‘an integral part of the deliberative and 
communicative processes by which [elected officials] participate in 
committee and House proceedings.’”165  
Even in a 2021 decision finding that a government official did not 
violate the First Amendment when blocking a constituent on Twitter, there 
is still a consensus on the general framework. In Campbell v. Reisch, the 
Eighth Circuit stated that a private account, in this case one devoted 
primarily to campaign activities, “can turn into a governmental one if it 
becomes an organ of official business.”166 In this case, however, the court 
found that Reisch did not meet the factors in Knight or Randall and that 
“she did not intend her Twitter page ‘to be like a public park, where anyone 
is welcome to enter and say whatever they want.’”167 The court instead 
likened the account to a campaign newsletter, and therefore, found that 
there was no state action.168 Without state action, there can be no violation 
of the First Amendment. 
IV. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND LESSONS LEARNED TO DATE 
In Packingham, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote that the internet in 
general, and social media in particular, have become the most important 
spaces in modern society for public discourse.169 More and more elected 
officials are relying on Facebook, Twitter, and other social media accounts 
to share information with constituents and receive important feedback in 
return in a cost-effective, efficient, and—especially during public 
emergencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic—safe and responsible 
manner. It is important for these government leaders to recognize the ways 
a personal (non-government sanctioned) social media page can quickly and 
inadvertently transform into a First Amendment battleground. Whether a 
                                                           
162 Id.  
163 Id.  
164 Id. at 868, 870. 
165 Id. at 869. 
166 Mike Campbell v. Representative Cheri Toalson Reisch, 986 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 
2021). 
167 Id.  
168 Id. 
169 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct 1730, 1735 (2017). 
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social media account will be viewed as an official as opposed to a private 
account will depend on how a court views the totality of the circumstances. 
Multiple factors will be considered, including whether the social media 
account was operated for primarily a private or public purpose. To 
determine the underlying purpose, questions will be asked such as:  
• Is the government official’s title and public office contact 
information on the page?  
• Is it being used primarily as a tool of governance to 
communicate about government activities?  
• Does it rely on the help of government employees and public 
resources to maintain the account?  
• Does the government official use the account while carrying out 
official responsibilities, such as tweeting about events the 
official is attending in an official capacity?  
 The trend in First Amendment jurisprudence is to find social 
media accounts that are used for official purposes to be some type of public 
forum primarily because interactive features of social media enable 
members of the public to speak by replying to tweets or posting comments. 
Therefore, in general, when public comment is invited on a government 
official’s social media site, comments should not be blocked, deleted, or 
hidden based on the content or viewpoint expressed. 
A public official does not surrender their own First Amendment 
rights by entering public service. They can have private social media 
accounts that stay private. To do so, the government official should not use 
the account for any official purpose or in a way that appears an extension of 
the public office in which they serve.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Just a short time ago, in 2018, the court in Morgan v. Bevin 
explicitly recognized that it was one of the first to “wrestle with the 
intersections of the application of free speech to developing technology and 
First Amendment rights of access to public officials using privately-owned 
channels of communication.”170 This reflection still rings true today, as a 
trickle of First Amendment cases make their way through the circuit courts 
and, eventually, to the United States Supreme Court. In the meantime, the 
importance and urgency of developing clear legal principles related to social 
media platforms escalates. There needs to be better guidance for elected 
officials who have no choice but to embrace this new technology to 
communicate and serve communities across the nation. As the Morgan 
court eloquently stated: 
                                                           
170  Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1009 (E.D. Ky. 2018). 
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Since 1791, we have given voice to a national value in favor 
of protecting robust political discourse in the words and 
promise of the First Amendment to the Constitution. This 
case requires the Court to test that value in an age in which 
citizens have never had more platforms to speak. Voice is 
no longer measured in only parchment or paper or access 
to the airwaves but also in the exponential potential of the 
internet.171 
While we wait to see when the United States Supreme Court will 
take up the issue of social media in the context of a public forum analysis, 
there seems to be an existing consensus among the circuit courts that if 
accounts are being used by officials, in a manner that suggests they are the 
official account of a government agent, the interactive portion of the account 
is a public forum. It is not clear what category of forum it may be, but it is 
not likely to matter because courts are analyzing blocking and deleting 
comments as viewpoint discrimination, and the acts would therefore need 
to pass strict scrutiny to be upheld as constitutional.  
The alternative argument, that this is government speech and can 
therefore promote a viewpoint, seems to have disappeared in the wake of 
the Fourth and Second Circuits’ opinions in Randall and Knight v. Trump, 
respectively. However, the nature and use of social media platforms are 
unique and ever-evolving. If best used as means for communicating a 
government official’s own visions, policies, and activities—the platform 
created tools for public viewing and input aside—there may still be a case for 
applying the government speech doctrine in some capacity.  
                                                           
171 Id. at 1005. 
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